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Presupposing Counterfactuality*
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Free University of Berlin
Abstract There is long standing agreement both among philosophers and linguists
that the term ‘counterfactual conditional’ is misleading if not a misnomer. Speakers
of both non-past subjunctive (or ‘would’) conditionals and past subjunctive (or
‘would have’) conditionals need not convey counterfactuality. The relationship
between the conditionals in question and the counterfactuality of their antecedents
is thus not one of presupposing. It is one of conversationally implicating. This paper
provides a thorough examination of the arguments against the presupposition view
as applied to past subjunctive conditionals and finds none of them conclusive. All
the relevant linguistic data, it is shown, are compatible with the assumption that past
subjunctive conditionals presuppose the falsity of their antecedents. This finding is
not only interesting on its own. It is of vital importance both to whether we should
consider antecedent counterfactuality to be part of the conventional meaning of the
conditionals in question and to whether there is a deep difference between indicative
and subjective conditionals.
Keywords: subjunctive conditionals, counterfactuals, presuppositions, conversational impli-
catures, common ground
1 Introduction
There is by now long standing agreement both among philosophers and linguists
that the term ‘counterfactual conditional’, though often used and well entrenched,
is misleading if not a misnomer. Speakers felicitously using the conditionals in
question may commonly convey that the antecedent is false, but contrary to what the
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Guillermo Del Pinal, Catharine Diehl, Alexander Dinges, Daniel Dohrn, Hadil Karawani, Brian
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label ‘counterfactual’ suggests, they by no means need to.1 The relationship between
these conditionals and the counterfactuality of their antecedents is thus not one of
presupposing. It is one of conversationally implicating.
This agreement enfolds two types of the conditionals in question, typically
individuated by tense:2 so-called ‘would’ or ‘non-past subjunctive conditionals’
(NPSCs for short), such as
(1) If Jones took cocaine, he would be dancing all night.
and so-called ‘would have’ or ‘past subjunctive conditionals’ (PSCs for short), such
as
(2) If Jones had taken cocaine, he would have been dancing all night.3
Neither NPSCs nor PSCs presuppose the falsity of their antecedents, it is held. If
the speaker of either conditional conveys the falsity of the antecedent at all, she
conversationally implicates it.4
There are two prominent arguments against the presupposition and in favor of the
conversational implicature view. The first goes back to Alan Anderson and provides
cases in which speakers use conditionals of the relevant form without committing
to the falsity of the antecedent. The second is due to Bob Stalnaker and offers a
reductio against the presupposition view: if NPSCs and PSCs were to presuppose the
falsity of their antecedents, modus tollens arguments containing them as premises
would come out as question begging.
Though widely endorsed, neither of these arguments has been discussed in detail.
In fact, most researchers these days almost exclusively talk about the various aspects
of the alleged conversational implicature, such as how it is calculated and under
which conditions it arises. The claim that the counterfactuality assumption actually
1 Here and in the following, I am using ‘to convey that p’ in a broad sense similar to Grice’s ‘to
(speaker) mean that p’.
2 I will confine myself to English counterfactual conditionals. For crosslinguistic investigations, see,
e.g., Iatridou 2000, Nevins 2002, and Karawani 2014.
3 I am borrowing the labels ‘non-past subjunctive conditional’ and ‘past subjunctive conditionals’ from
Ippolito 2003. Further common labels are ‘present counterfactuals’ and ‘past counterfactuals’.
4 The conversational implicature view is defended in, e.g., Stalnaker 1975, Karttunen & Peters
1979: 4ff., Comrie 1986: 89, von Fintel 1998, von Fintel 2012: 467, Iatridou 2000: 232, Nevins
2002, Ippolito 2003: 147, Edgington 2008, Leahy 2011a: 258f., Leahy 2011b, Leahy 2018, and
Arregui & Biezma 2015. See, similarly, Starr 2014: 1024 and Mackay 2019: 12. The only more recent
proponents of the presupposition view are Portner 1992 and Karawani 2014. For the claim that the
falsity of the antecedent is ‘implied’, see Will 1947, Hampshire 1948, and Pears 1950.
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is a conversational implicature is often simply taken for granted.5 This is surprising
because the conversational implicature view is not without problems. Not only has
developing an account of the calculation of the alleged conversational implicature
proven to be more complicated than one might have hoped.6 We also seem to be
forced to accept that some of the proclaimed conversational implicatures are not
cancellable.7
This paper is a first step towards filling this gap in the debate on the semantics
and pragmatics of what are still called ‘counterfactual conditionals’. It provides
a thorough examination of the arguments against the presupposition view as ap-
plied to PSCs — the second type of conditionals listed above — and finds none of
them conclusive. All the relevant linguistic data, it is shown, are compatible with
the assumption that PSCs presuppose the falsity of their antecedents. The paper
does not assess analogous arguments against the presupposition view as applied to
NPSCs — the first type of conditionals from above. Here, the presupposition view
seems less plausible to me, and so I am inclined to think that one major difference
between PSCs and NPSCs is that while the former presuppose, the latter merely
conversationally implicate antecedent falsity, but I will have to leave this as well
as the question of how this difference is encoded in tense and how it relates to the
question of whether there is a deep difference between indicative and subjunctive
conditionals to future research.8
The paper is divided into four sections. In Section 2, I examine different versions
of Anderson’s argument. In Section 3, I investigate Stalnaker’s argument. In Sec-
tion 4, I consider two further arguments against the presupposition view for PSCs
due to Dorothy Edgington and Kai von Fintel. In Section 5, I briefly sum up.
Before I start, let me clarify two things. First, I will stay neutral on the contro-
versy of whether PSCs have truth values.9 I take the conclusion of this paper to be
compatible with and relevant to both sides of the divide, but I will not dwell on the
various ways to incorporate it here. Second, while I will not start from a specific view
of presuppositions, I will make the following assumption: (Ass) If PSCs presuppose
the falsity of their antecedents, then speakers using PSCs presuppose the falsity
5 See, for instance, Iatridou 2000, Ippolito 2003, Leahy 2011a, Leahy 2011b, Leahy 2018, and Ar-
regui & Biezma 2015. One exception is von Fintel (1998), who discusses in detail whether (past-
)subjunctive conditionals could be true counterfactuals.
6 For the most recent discussion, see Leahy 2018. For criticism of (an early version of) Leahy’s
approach, see Starr 2014: 1025.
7 See, e.g., Arregui & Biezma 2015. See also conditionals like my example (24) below, which have
gone unnoticed in the literature so far.
8 For the claim that there is a ‘profound semantic difference’, see Gibbard 1981: 211, and also Bennett
2003: 256. For the opposite claim, see, e.g., Edgington 2008 and Starr 2014. For discussion, see, e.g.,
von Fintel 2012.
9 For the claim that they do not, see, e.g., Adams 1975, Gibbard 1981, and Edgington 1986.
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of the respective antecedents at every context of felicitous use. By way of (Ass) I
will mostly talk of speakers of PSCs presupposing things, while I will ultimately
counter objections that are commonly directed against PSCs themselves presuppos-
ing things. Support for (Ass) comes from two different directions. (i) (Ass) plausibly
entails that presuppositions, unlike conversational implicatures, are not contextually
cancellable (neither are they explicitly cancellable) in the sense specified by Grice
1989: ch. 2: they are present at every context at which the sentences triggering
them are felicitously used. (ii) (Ass) is plausible as a claim about the connection
between what are often called semantic or sentence presuppositions (left hand side
of (Ass)) and what are often called pragmatic or speaker presuppositions (right hand
side of (Ass)). In any case, (Ass) seems to be shared among my opponents, that
is opponents of the presupposition view for PSCs. For often enough they object
to the claim that PSCs presuppose the falsity of their antecedents by arguing that
speakers using PSCs do not presuppose the falsity of the respective antecedents at
every context of felicitous use (i.e., they deny the left hand side of (Ass) by arguing
against the right hand side of it). Note that (Ass) is compatible with both semantic
characterizations of presuppositions, according to which false presuppositions make
the sentences triggering them gappy, and conversational characterizations, according
to which presuppositions are secondary, non-at-isse, non-proffered, or backgrounded
contents. (Ass) is thus impartial to different views of presuppositions and can be
taken on board by scholars from different backgrounds.
2 Anderson’s argument
Consider the following PSC, which will be called Anderson Conditional:
(3) If Jones had taken arsenic, he would have shown the same symptoms he
actually shows.
Assume that this sentence is used by a doctor, call her A, at the autopsy of Jones’s
body. Anderson holds that
in [the autopsy] context the doctor’s statement [of (3)] would probably
be taken as lending support to the view that Jones took arsenic — it
would certainly not be held to imply that Jones did not take arsenic.
(Anderson 1951: 37)
We can give the thought expressed here a more linguistic spin by looking at the
following two utterances by our doctor A:
(4) A: If Jones had taken arsenic, he would have shown the same symptoms
he actually shows. So he did not take arsenic.
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(5) A: If Jones had taken arsenic, he would have shown the same symptoms
he actually shows. So he took arsenic.
Anderson seems to assume that, given the presupposition view, (4) should sound
fine and (5) should sound bad. Intuitively, though, it is the other way around: (4) is
bad and (5) is fine. The presupposition view should thus be rejected. In the autopsy
context, A does not presuppose that the antecedent of the Anderson Conditional is
false.10 But why exactly would one think that the presupposition view makes these
counterintuitive predictions?
Let’s start with (4). The presupposition view seems to predict that A is not
contradicting herself. She is presupposing that Jones did not take arsenic and she is
stating precisely the same: that Jones did not take arsenic. Her contribution should
thus come out as fine. Consider furthermore the following utterance:
(6) A: The man with the martini is wearing pink shorts. So there is someone
drinking martini.
According to the presupposition view, this utterance is similar to the one in case (4):
A first presupposes and then explicitly states that someone is drinking martini. This
utterance sounds perfectly fine. By analogy, (4) should thus come out fine as well.
Let’s next consider (5). The presupposition view seems to predict that A is
contradicting herself. She is presupposing that Jones did not take arsenic and she is
stating that Jones did take arsenic. Her contribution should thus come out as bad.
Consider also the following utterance:
(7) A: The man with the martini is wearing pink shorts. So there is nobody
drinking martini.
According to the presupposition view, this utterance is similar to the one in case (5):
A first presupposes that somebody is drinking martini and then explicitly denies that
this is the case. This utterance sounds bad. So by analogy, (5) should come out bad
as well.
2.1 Rebuttal: Part I
I will postpone the discussion of the arguments by analogy to Section 2.2 and for
now concentrate on the first type of the challenge. My objection to both parts of this
10 Various authors make use of this argument. See, e.g., Stalnaker (1975: 277): ‘If the butler had done
it, we would have found just the clues which we in fact found. Here a conditional is presented as
evidence for the truth of its antecedent. The conditional cannot be counterfactual, since it would be
selfdefeating to presuppose false what one is trying to show true’.
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challenge will rely on the claim that for contributions of the form (4) and (5) to be
fine not one but two conditions have to be met:
(i) A is not contradicting herself.
(ii) A is providing a good reason for the claim made by the second sentence.
The second condition is motivated by the fact that by introducing the second sentence
of (4) and (5) with ‘so’, A triggers the expectation that this second sentence is the
conclusion of some kind of argument and that what she said before provides a
good reason for the conclusion. I will argue in the following that Anderson-style
arguments overlook that (4) violates the second condition and that they are wrong to
assume that, on the presupposition view, (5) violates the first.
The argument regarding (4) is straightforward. It is clear that condition (i) (the no
contradiction condition) is fulfilled: by presupposing that Jones did not take arsenic
and then asserting precisely the same, A is not contradicting herself. It is anything
but clear, however, that condition (ii) (the good reasons condition) is fulfilled as
well. With her utterance of the Anderson Conditional, A is conveying that a certain
relevant, necessary condition for Jones’s having taken arsenic is met. This, though,
only provides a good reason for the claim that Jones did take arsenic. It does not
provide a good reason for the claim that Jones did not take arsenic. This shows that
proponents of the presupposition view can explain why (4) sounds bad after all: it
sounds bad because A does not provide a good reason for what she presents as a
conclusion.
The argument regarding (5) is a bit more complex. To begin with, let us rehearse
a well-known and widely-shared picture according to which presuppositions and
assertions, though different in several respects, share an important feature: with them,
speakers take a stand on the common ground. More precisely, by presupposing that
p and asserting that p alike, speakers either suggest to put p in the common ground
or they endorse the fact that p is already in the common ground (Stalnaker 1973 and
Stalnaker 1978).11 Does this picture entail that by presupposing that not-p and then
asserting that p the speaker takes jointly inconsistent stands and thus contradicts
herself?
Let us call to mind some more details of the above picture. The common ground
is conceived as the set of propositions that the participants of the conversation
mutually accept. Acceptance of p is taken to be a weak positive attitude towards
11 This general assumption is compatible with various theories of presuppositions and assertions. In
particular, it is compatible with the different ways of thinking about presuppositions mentioned in
the introduction. Note that it may be easier to felicitously endorse a proposition that is already in the
common ground by presupposing it than by asserting it, but since this difference is not going to be
important in the following, I will gloss over it.
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p that is compatible with a range of different more specific attitudes towards p.
Most often, one will accept that p because one believes that p, but one can also
accept that p because one, for instance, assumes it for certain purposes, for instance,
as a helpful simplification, to reduce p to absurdity, etc. (Stalnaker 1974: 51 and
Stalnaker 2002: 716). Importantly, these more specific attitudes are not only inde-
pendent (one can believe that p without assuming that p and vice versa). They can
also be consistently held towards incompatible propositions. For instance, one can
consistently believe that p and assume that not-p. Given the notion of acceptance
in play, participants of a conversation can thus (individually or mutually) accept
incompatible propositions: if they accept that p because they believe p to be the case
and accept that not-p because they assume that for a given purpose, no inconsistency
arises.
This shows that by presupposing that not-p and then asserting that p the speaker
need not take jointly inconsistent stands on the common ground. If she presupposes
that not-p in order for not-p to be mutually accepted as an assumption for a given
purpose and then asserts that p in order for p to be mutually accepted as something
that is actually the case, no inconsistency arises. She is thus not contradicting herself.
But isn’t the speaker still aiming for a common ground that contains incompatible
propositions? And aren’t such cases commonly taken to result in a break down
of the conversation? If one thinks that (a) there is exactly one common ground
which is (b) a homogenous whole to which (c) propositions can only be added as
the conversation proceeds, it seems indeed natural to expect a break down of the
conversation. After all, if both speech acts are successful the common ground will
be inconsistent in an obvious way and so allow for all kinds of mad inferences.
However, each of these three assumptions is controversial, and they should at best
be accepted as simplifications or idealizations. To adequately model the complexity
of our conversational reality, we should either — in contrast to (a) — acknowledge
that there are at least two common grounds, an official and an unofficial one (Stokke
2013a: 55ff.), or — opposed to (b) — think of the one common ground as being
compartmentalized so that propositions associated with different attitudes are stored
in different compartments, e.g., there is one for propositions that are merely assumed
and one for propositions that are actually believed (Yalcin 2018), or we should — in
contrast to (c) — think of the common ground as something to and from which
propositions can be added and subtracted as the conversation proceeds (Karttunen &
Peters 1979: 8, n.5 and Leahy 2018: 61).12 Each modification would be sufficient
to prevent a break down of the conversation in the cases in question. According to
the first and second, successfully presupposing that not-p and then asserting that p
12 Interestingly, these latter two papers use the possibility of a temporary revision of the common
ground to defend the view that indicative conditionals presuppose the epistemic possibility of their
antecedents. Using the same idea to defend the presupposition view of PSCs is therefore not ad hoc.
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will lead to not-p and p being stored in two kinds of common ground or two parts
of just one common ground. According to the third, successfully presupposing that
not-p and then asserting that p will result in a common ground which, at a first stage,
contains not-p, but, at a second stage, does not contain not-p anymore.13
But wouldn’t it follow that speakers can always unproblematically string to-
gether speech acts that suggest or endorse jointly incompatible propositions? More
specifically, wouldn’t it follow that there is nothing strange about conjoining a
presupposition of p with a presupposition of not-p, and likewise, an assertion of
p with an assertion of not-p? This is a general challenge for all of the accounts of
the common ground outlined. Let me point to two plausible addenda to avoid such
consequences. First, it may well be that with presuppositions and assertions alike,
speakers take a stand on what the participants of the conversation should mutually
accept, but this is compatible with presuppositions and assertions being governed
by different norms. While the norm of assertion seems to be belief or something
even stronger, the norm of presupposition seems to be weaker than belief. That is,
for a speaker’s assertion that p to be proper, she has to at least believe that p, but for
a respective presupposition to be proper, she only has to assume that p for certain
purposes (for norms of assertion, see, e.g., Williamson 1996, Lackey 2007, and
Turri 2017). To corroborate, note that (a) the talk of ‘asserting something for the
purposes of the conversation’ is far stranger than that of ‘presupposing something
for the purposes of the conversation’, and that (b) we are far less happy to explicitly
assert the existence of fictional characters than to presuppose it. This should give
the assumption of different norms at the very least some initial plausibility. Being
governed by different norms would help to explain why it is easier to felicitously
concatenate a presupposition and an assertion of jointly incompatible propositions
than it is to felicitously concatenate two presuppositions or two assertions of jointly
incompatible propositions. Second, inconsistent concatenations may be allowed only
if the speaker clarifies her attitudes towards the relevant propositions to her audience.
One option is to tell her audience outright about her attitudes; another is to provide
more indirect evidence, for instance, by giving reasons which undermine the one
proposition (and so make clear that it was merely assumed) and support the other
13 Immediate support for this claim comes from the following cases known from the debate on protago-
nist projection (see Holton 1997, but also Stokke 2013b and Buckwalter 2014):
(i) A: Tim knew that Tom would never let him down, but, like all the others, he in the end
did.
(ii) A: Jill saw a shooting star last night. She wished on it, but it was just a satellite.
According to one prominent construal at least, A is here presupposing something which, as she
immediately afterwards reveals, she does not take to be the case. Both cases sound fine, though.
8
ea
r
ly
a
c
c
ess
(and by that make clear that it is supposed to be believed). If the speaker does not
clarify her attitudes, her contribution comes out odd. This too would forestall the
overgeneralization worry. Both addenda need to be worked out in more detail, but I
take them to be plausible enough to shift the burden of proof to those who press the
overgeneralization worry.
We can thus conclude that the presupposition view as applied to contribution
(5) does not predict a violation of condition (i) (the no contradiction condition).
If the proposition that Jones did not take arsenic is meant to be accepted only as
an assumption for certain purposes and the proposition that Jones took arsenic is
meant to be accepted as something to be believed, no inconsistency arises. What
about condition (ii) (the good reasons condition)? With her utterance of the Ander-
son Conditional, A is conveying that a certain necessary and also clearly relevant
condition for Jones’s having taken arsenic is met: there is no doubt that Jones is
showing the symptoms he is actually showing. This, recall, does not provide a good
reason for the claim that Jones did not take arsenic. But it does provide a good reason
for the claim that Jones did take arsenic. Admittedly, it does not provide a full, but
only a partial reason. But still, given certain background assumptions, even a partial
reason can be a good enough reason for a claim. This shows that proponents of the
presupposition view can explain why (5) sounds fine after all: it sounds fine since A
is not contradicting herself and provides a good reason for what she presents as a
conclusion.
2.2 Rebuttal: Part II
So far we have only addressed the first challenge presented at the beginning of
Section 2. As for the argument by analogy, recall the relevant two utterances (6) and
(7):
(6) A: The man with the martini is wearing pink shorts. So there is someone
drinking martini.
(7) A: The man with the martini is wearing pink shorts. So there is nobody
drinking martini.
A’s utterance in (6) sounds fine and her utterance in (7) sounds strange. So, shouldn’t
we expect the same pattern for (4) and (5), given the presupposition view?
In light of the discussion above, it should be clear that (6) and (7) are relevantly
dissimilar from (4) and (5). Relevantly similar cases would have the speaker first
presuppose a proposition and then present reasons for doubting this very proposition,
such as in the following two cases:
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(8) A: The man with the martini is drinking something that looks, smells and
tastes like water. So there is someone drinking martini.
(9) A: The man with the martini is drinking something that looks, smells and
tastes like water. So there is nobody drinking martini.
By using the definite description, A is presupposing that somebody is drinking
martini and by attributing ‘is drinking something that looks, smells and tastes like
water’ she is providing reasons against this proposition. She is providing reasons for
thinking that the man in question is not drinking martini. So (4) and (5) are much
more like (8) and (9) than like (6) and (7). And with (8) and (9), we have the same
intuitive pattern as with (4) and (5): concluding that the presupposition is true is
strange and concluding that the presupposition is not true is fine.
If you are suspicious of the examples because they contain definite descriptions
that are used referentially (as opposed to attributively), take a look at the following
cases:14
(10) A: The round square has two properties that very rarely show up together.
So there is a round square.
(11) A: The round square has two properties that very rarely show up together.
So there is no round square.
Just like with the Anderson Conditional, A is presupposing something while provid-
ing reasons for doubting the presupposition in (10) and (11). Here, too, we have the
same intuitive pattern as with (4) and (5): concluding that the presupposition is true
is strange and concluding that the presupposition is not true is fine.15
To avoid misunderstandings, let me be clear that the presupposition view I
suggest does not entail that presuppositions are cancellable in the sense that one
can use a sentence without conveying that p (Grice 1989: ch. 2 and Zakkou 2018).
With PSCs, speakers always convey that the antecedent is contrary to the facts. They
always suggest to add not-p to the common ground or endorse the fact that it is
already in the common ground. It’s just that the suggestion or endorsement can be
14 For the distinction between referential and attributive uses of definite descriptions, see, most promi-
nently, Donnellan 1966. To be clear, I don’t think that the examples are suspicious just because the
descriptions are used referentially. Following Kripke (1977), they are good cases in point: just as
referentially used definite descriptions carry a presupposition that need not be believed by the speaker,
Anderson-style PSCs (i.e., PSCs with a necessarily true consequent) carry presuppositions that need
not be believed by the speaker.
15 Note that I’m not committed to the claim that we can replicate the data for just any presupposition
trigger. I only need some cases that work similarly to get my account going. Recall in this context
also the examples (i) and (ii) from footnote 13.
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merely temporary, or it can concern a specific compartment of the common ground
or an unofficial common ground.
2.3 Further cases
Up until now, we have focused on (4) and (5), in which our speaker first utters the
Anderson Conditional and then states the falsity or truth of the antecedent. But what
about cases in which our speaker first states the falsity or truth of the antecedent and
then utters the Anderson Conditional? And what about cases in which she intersects
the plain statements within the Anderson Conditional?
As for the first question, consider the following exchanges between A and her
colleague B:
(12) B: Jones did not take arsenic.
A: Right. If Jones had taken arsenic, he would have shown the same
symptoms he actually shows.
(13) B: Jones took arsenic.
A: Right. If Jones had taken arsenic, he would have shown the same
symptoms he actually shows.
A’s response in (12) sounds strange while her response in (13) sounds fine. However,
even though, compared to (4) and (5), the order of the sentences is reversed, (12)
and (13) are similar to (4) and (5) in that we naturally take A to give the conditional
as a reason for the affirmation of the claim that Jones did not take arsenic and that
Jones did take arsenic, respectively. Proponents of the presupposition view can thus
offer the very same account of the two data points they have given before for (4) and
(5): A’s response in (12) sounds strange because even though she is not contradicting
herself with first stating that Jones did not take arsenic and then presupposing that
he did not take it, the Anderson Conditional does not provide a good reason for what
needs confirmation. A’s response in (13), in contrast, sounds fine because, as spelled
out above, she is neither contradicting herself with asserting that Jones took arsenic
and then presupposing that he did not take it, nor does she fail to provide a good
reason for what she is trying to show.
To corroborate this, note that the intuitions about (12) and (13) become even
clearer when we insert an explanation marker like ‘for’ after ‘Right’ to force a reason
giving reading. Consider the following:
(14) B: Jones did not take arsenic.
A: Right. For if Jones had taken arsenic, he would have shown the same
symptoms he actually shows.
11
ea
r
ly
a
c
c
es
s
Julia Zakkou
(15) B: Jones took arsenic.
A: Right. For if Jones had taken arsenic, he would have shown the same
symptoms he actually shows.
It is even clearer now that A’s response in (14) is strange and her response in (15)
is fine. Correspondingly, intuitive verdicts are reversed once we insert a contrast
marker like ‘but’ after ‘Right’, which forces a contrastive reading instead. Consider
(16) B: Jones did not take arsenic.
A: Right. But if Jones had taken arsenic, he would have shown the same
symptoms he actually shows.
(17) B: Jones took arsenic.
A: Right. But if Jones had taken arsenic, he would have shown the same
symptoms he actually shows.
A’s response in (16) seems fine now and her response in (17) strange. Proponents of
the presupposition view can account for this: A’s response in (16) is fine because
even though she commits to the view that Jones did not take arsenic by ‘Right’, she
provides a reason against this claim with the Anderson Conditional. So her use of
the contrast marker makes perfect sense. A’s response in (17) is strange, however,
because A does not only commit to the claim that Jones took arsenic by ‘Right’, she
also provides a reason for this very claim. Hence her use of the contrast marker is
odd.
As for the second question raised at the beginning of this section, consider the
following utterances:
(18) A: If Jones had taken arsenic — which he didn’t — he would have shown
the same symptoms he actually shows.
(19) A: If Jones had taken arsenic — which he did — he would have shown the
same symptoms he actually shows.
Intuitions might not be univocal but it seems that there are contexts in which (18)
and (19) are fine.16
Consider (18) first. One might think that, given the presupposition view, this
utterance should strike us as redundant, because A is both presupposing and then
stating that Jones did not take arsenic. In light of what I said before, however, it should
be clear that this would be much too quick. According to the presupposition view,
we can understand A as signaling that she accepts the proposition that Jones did not
take arsenic for the time being and as going then on record that she actually believes
16 For the claim that the acceptability of utterances similar to (19) speak in favor of the conversational
implicature view, see Ippolito 2003: 147.
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this.17 Of course, in conversations in which it is either entirely uncontroversial that
Jones did not take arsenic or completely irrelevant whether he did, stressing her
belief will sound somewhat strange. But in a conversation in which the question of
whether Jones took arsenic is controversial and of great importance, revealing her
belief that Jones did not take it can make perfect sense.
Consider next (19). One might think that, given the presupposition view, A’s
utterance should strike us as contradictory, because, on the presupposition view, A
is here presupposing and asserting jointly incompatible propositions. But, again,
in light of what I said before, it should be clear that things are more complicated.
There surely are conversations in which everyone will be just fine with assuming
a certain proposition, say, for simplicity’s sake, and where the actual truth of the
proposition is not of great importance. But there are other contexts in which one is
happy to go along as far as a certain assumption is concerned but in which one still
finds it important to go on record that one actually believes the opposite. In these
latter cases, at least, (19) will sound fine.
So, to sum up, proponents of the presupposition view can counter Anderson’s
objection. The assumption that by using the Anderson Conditional — the PSC
(3) — one presupposes that the antecedent is contrary to the facts does not have
counterintuitive consequences.
3 Stalnaker’s argument
Consider the following PSC:
(20) If Jones had taken cocaine, he would have been dancing right now.
Assume that this sentence is used by a detective, call her C, as part of a drug
investigation. More concretely, assume that C utters the following:
(21) C: If Jones had taken cocaine, he would have been dancing right now. He
is not dancing right now. So Jones did not take cocaine.
Stalnaker claims that the presupposition view falsely predicts that C’s reasoning is
bad. Not because C would be contradicting herself, nor because C would not be
giving a good reason for what she presents as a conclusion. The problem rather
seems to be that, by presupposing that Jones did not take cocaine, C would assume
something in an argument that she only tries to establish in the course of her
reasoning. Case (21) should thus come out as question begging — that is, as an
17 See in this context also Mayr & Romoli 2016 and Sudo ms who claim that it is not always redundant
to assert what can be taken to be presupposed.
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argument that has its conclusion as a premise — even though, intuitively, it sounds
perfectly fine. Or to use Stalnaker’s own words:
The subjunctive conditional premiss in [a] modus tollens argument
cannot be counterfactual since if it were the speaker would be bla-
tantly begging the question by presupposing, in giving his argument,
that this conclusion was true. (Stalnaker 1975: 277)
Stalnaker thus concludes that in a case like (21) C does not presuppose the falsity of
the antecedent.
I agree that, intuitively, (21) sounds fine and not question begging. But the
assumption that the presupposition view predicts otherwise seems to rest on a
confusion of two senses of the word ‘presupposing’. There is not only the somewhat
technical sense used before; there is also a perhaps more intuitive sense according to
which presupposing something in an argument roughly means to tacitly introduce it
as a premise.
The proponent of the presupposition view will happily acknowledge that, given
the first, technical sense, C presupposes the conclusion in (21). But it is not clear
why she should accept that presupposing the conclusion in this sense would make
(21) question begging. Compare the following utterance which does not feature a
PSC:
(22) C: If Jones took cocaine yesterday — which he didn’t — he would be
dancing right now. He is not dancing right now. So he did not take
cocaine.18
Even opponents of the presupposition view can agree that, in (22), C presupposes
that Jones did not take cocaine yesterday by her use of the parenthesis. Yet the
argument is not question begging, because C only anticipates the conclusion. She
merely indicates the argumentative direction she is taking, she does not introduce it
as a premise. Both (21) and (22) are thus analogous to the following:
(23) C: Jones did not take cocaine yesterday. If Jones took cocaine yesterday,
he would be dancing right now. He is not dancing right now. So he did
not take cocaine.
18 Of the 10 native English speakers I consulted, 8 shared my impression that the NPSC ‘If Jones
took cocaine yesterday, he would be dancing right now’ can be fine in context. Of course, a bigger,
representative sample has to be queried. For one case in my favor, though, see episode 15 of season 7
of the show Friends (‘The One With Joey’s New Brain’) where, at 12.46, Joey’s colleague Cecilia
(like Joey a star of the soap opera Days Of Our Lives) says: ‘If I left [Days of Our Lives] 15 years
ago, the landscape of Mexican cinema would be very different today’.
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Here, too, C merely anticipates the conclusion without introducing it as a question
begging premise.19
Moreover, ask yourself why the conversational implicature view would be any
better off regarding (21) than the presupposition view and thus why presupposing
the conclusion in the first, technical sense would lead to question-beggingness any
more than conversationally implicating the conclusion would. You might think this
has something to do with the fact that conversational implicatures are cancellable
whereas presuppositions are not. Or you might hold that it is due to the fact that,
on the presupposition view, the PSC in (21) depends for its truth on whether Jones
took cocaine, while, on the conversational implicature view, it does not. Consider
the following PSC (24), though:
(24) If Jones had taken potassium cyanide, he would have shown completely
different symptoms than he actually shows.
Now look at the following contribution:
(25) C: If Jones had taken potassium cyanide, he would have shown com-
pletely different symptoms than he actually shows. Jones does not
show completely different symptoms than he actually shows. So Jones
did not take potassium cyanide.
This argument is not question begging. Scholars from all sides will have to agree,
however, that whether its a conversational implicature or a presupposition, the
proposition that Jones did not take potassium cyanide as conveyed by C’s use of PSC
(24) is not cancellable. ‘If Jones had taken potassium cyanide, he would have shown
completely different symptoms than he actually shows. But I don’t mean to suggest
that Jones did not take potassium cyanide’ sounds clearly off. Additionally, people
from all sides will most likely grant that (24) entails the falsity of the antecedent.
They will thus acknowledge that (24) depends for its truth on whether Jones took
potassium cyanide. So if (21) poses a problem for the presupposition view, an
analogous problem arises for everybody in the case of (25). In fact, however, there is
no problem for anybody. In the case of both (21) and (25), C merely anticipates the
conclusion of her argument while stating her first premise.
The proponent of the presupposition view will also grant that, given the second,
more ordinary sense of ‘presupposing’, presupposing the falsity of the antecedent
should make (21) question begging. For presupposing that Jones did not take cocaine
19 This might mean that C proposes to add the anticipated conclusion into, for instance, an unofficial
common ground. Alternatively, she may propose to update the official common ground knowing that
her interlocutors have reason enough to accept this proposal only after they have heard the whole
argument.
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in this second sense would mean to introduce this proposition as a tacit premise. And
this in turn would mean to introduce the conclusion as a premise. But she need not
accept that C presupposes the conclusion in (21) in this second sense. As indicated,
she has to accept that C presupposes the conclusion in the first and technical sense,
but this does not mean that she introduces this presupposition as a premise. She may
merely anticipate the conclusion to indicate the direction the argument is taking.
We can thus conclude that the presupposition view does not predict that (21)
sounds question begging. The view does entail that the conclusion of the argument in
(21) is presupposed in the first, technical sense of ‘presupposing the conclusion’, but
this does not imply question-beggingness. The view does not, however, entail (nor
suggest otherwise) that the conclusion is presupposed in the second, more intuitive
sense (‘tacitly introducing the conclusion as a premise’). So even though this would
imply question-beggingness, it is not a prediction of the presupposition view. Just
like Anderson’s argument, Stalnaker’s objection to the presupposition view seems
inconclusive. All the relevant linguistic data are compatible with the presupposition
view.
4 Further arguments
Anderson’s and Stalnaker’s arguments are by far the most cited objections to the
presupposition view. But they are not the only ones. In this section, I will briefly
address two further reasons for abandoning the presupposition view.
The first can be attributed to Edgington (2008). She asks us to consider a case in
which our detective C utters the following in an investigation to a drug crime:
(26) C: If Jones had taken cocaine, he would have been dancing right now. So
let’s go to his place and see whether he is dancing right now.
Intuitively, this utterance sounds fine. One might think that this poses a challenge for
the presupposition view.20 If C already knew that Jones did not take cocaine, why
would she go to his place to see whether he is dancing? To spell this out a bit: if C
finds that he is dancing right now, she cannot infer anything regarding the question
at hand, because Jones’s dancing is compatible with both the assumption that he
took cocaine and the assumption that he did not. Meanwhile, if she finds that he is
not dancing right now, she can only infer what she already knew, namely that Jones
did not take cocaine.
Given what we said above, it should be clear where the argument goes wrong:
presupposing that Jones did not take cocaine does not require knowing or even
believing that Jones did not take cocaine. So C may very well feel the need to go to
20 See, e.g., Leahy 2018: sec. 4.3.
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Jones’s place to see whether he is still dancing. For if she finds that he is not, she
will come to know what she previously only presupposed, namely that Jones did not
take cocaine.
The second argument is due to von Fintel (1998). He asks us to consider a case
in which our doctor A utters the following in response to B’s question about how the
dinner was with their colleagues Polly and Uli:
(27) C: If Polly had come to dinner tonight, we would have had a good time. If
Uli had made the same amount of food that he in fact made, she would
have eaten most of it.
Intuitively, this utterance sounds fine. Unlike the Anderson Conditional, though,
which has a consequent that cannot be false, the second conditional here has an
antecedent that cannot be false: necessarily, Uli made the same amount of food he in
fact made. One might think that this rules out the presupposition view, because it
does not make sense to presuppose something that is obviously necessarily false.21
It seems to me, however, that (27) is naturally understood as a case of modal
subordination in the sense of Roberts 1989: by evaluating the second conditional,
we do not think of the actual situation in which Uli made the same amount of
food he in fact made. We think of a counterfactual situation in which Uli made the
same amount of food he in fact made and in which Polly came to the party. By
presupposing that this situation does not obtain, A is not presupposing a necessary
falsehood because Polly could have failed to come. It is thus not clear that (27)
provides a counterexample to the presupposition view. To support this suggestion,
note that PSCs with necessarily true antecedents cannot be discourse initials. They
are fine when preceded by another PSC as in (27), but they are strange if they are
the first sentence in a conversation. This is what one would expect given the modal
subordination view.
5 Conclusion
I have argued that the most prominent and presumably strongest arguments against
the claim that PSCs presuppose the falsity of their antecedents are inconclusive.
All the relevant linguistic data involving PSCs are compatible with the assumption
that speakers of such conditionals always presuppose the falsity of the respective
antecedents. This means that the conversational implicature view cannot be taken
for granted. The presupposition view is a viable alternative, which should be further
explored.
21 See von Fintel 1998: 39.
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